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IN CONNECTION with some work on sea-
sonal adjustment procedures last winter, I
had occasion to look over a hundred sea-
sonally adjusted monthly production series
for the postwar period. I was surprised by
the extent and diversity of change. Questions
soon arose concerning the significance of
large and diverse changes not only for sea-
sonal adjustment but also
for cyclical and trend an-
alysis and, more broadly,
for economic analysis gen-
erally. Presently, I found
myself extending the time
horizon back half a cen-
tury, to 1913, and roaming
far afield. This article is a
condensed, but not brief,
account of my wanderings.
The year 1913 was the
last year before the first of
two world wars. It was the
year when, by constitution-
al amendment, Federal income taxes were
authorized. It was the year of the Federal
Reserve Act. And that year the University
of California published Wesley Mitchell's
Business Cycles [1].
Mitchell examined all the theories of crises
and all the numbers then available—mostly
annual data. He found enough similarity in
fluctuations from one peacetime period to
another and from one industrial country to
another to feel justified in referring to
all such fluctuations as "cycles." His analysis
took into account a wide range of influences
but revolved around those affecting profits,
which he regarded as central in a pecuniary
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economy. Most of his data and charts related
either to prices for commodities and serv-
ices, or to banking and financial statistics
(Chart 1); relatively little organized infor-
mation was available for production, em-
ployment, or income.
Mitchell attempted to develop a theory
of self-generating movements that could be
checked in large part by
reference to time series. He
had a place in his account,
however, for changing ex-
pectations and other reali-
ties not readily represented
by time series. He hoped
that generalizations derived
from an expanding volume
of information—and limi-
ted as to time, place, and
institutional environment—
could be used, with due
caution, for purposes of
prediction and control.
In another pioneer volume of theory and
statistics written in the late 1920's and
published in 1930, Simon Kuznets examined
Secular Movements in Production and
Prices [2]. His heading for the first chapter
was "Retardation of Industrial Growth." He
observed general tendencies for growth in
particular manufacturing industries to slow
down; for gains from particular inventions
such as the steam engine to peter out; and
for new inventions to be less significant than
old, a point he illustrated by comparing elec-
tricity and the steam engine.
One reason, he said, that gains in par-
ticular manufacturing industries tended to
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slow down—a tendency noted earlier by
Raymond D. Prescott [3]—was the lack of
similar improvements in sectors supplying
materials. Kuznets found output per acre of
cotton and three other major crops little
changed for many decades. He also found
that after eliminating "primary" trends from
various series covering half a century or
more there remained broad "secondary"
movements considerably longer than busi-
ness cycles, running about 18 to 20 years
(Chart 2). Primary and secondary trends,
he thought, should be studied in relation
to each other and to cycles. Trends in prices
and production should be examined to-
gether.
This study of trends was quickly followed
in 1932 by another comprehensive Kuznets
book, this time on Seasonal Variations in
Industry and Trade [4]. Seasonal move-
ments, like cycles and trends, of course, had
been studied in the 1920's or before by
various other people, especially at Harvard
University, at the National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research, and in the Federal Reserve
System. Frederick R. Macaulay was one of
the pioneers in developing new techniques,
as for seasonal adjustment, although his per-
ceptive volume on The Smoothing of Time
Series [5] did not appear until 1931.
In constructing the Board's new index of
industrial production in 1927, Woodlief
Thomas was already using monthly seasonal
factors which changed over the years. He
was also using nonworking-day allowances
to reduce the irregular component in sea-
sonally adjusted and unadjusted series, a
refinement Kuznets let go in order to cover
a large number of series (Chart 3). And
in the early 193O's, to facilitate interpreta-
tion of changes from one day to the next
in the amount of currency in circulation,
Aryness Joy was making daily adjustments
that took into account the influence of the
day of the week, the day of the month, and
the season of the year.
Analysis of economic developments
through the use of national income ac-
counts developed later. This approach—
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based in part on Kuznets' work on national
income and given impetus by the Keynesian
formulation of aggregative economics—was
perhaps more readily related to formation of
public policy, especially fiscal policy, than
the analysis embodied in the Mitchell ap-
proach. In somewhat different ways, how-
ever, both approaches aimed initially at de-
scription and prediction. In the theory of
the national income approach, causal rela-
tionships—such as that between income and
consumption—were stressed more than time
sequences—leads and lags. But as a matter
of practice, study of causal relationships has
proved to be closely related to study of time
sequences and subject to similar problems in
a changing economy.
Discussion of other differences between
these two broad approaches, such as differ-
ent emphases on changes in prices and in
expectations, together with discussion of the
varying degrees to which these approaches
have been integrated with each other by dif-
ferent analysts, could easily occupy the re-
mainder of this article. But economic change
is first in our title, and not much has been
said yet either about the nation's economy
before World War I or about changes since
that time.
In 1913, only 97 million people lived in
the United States. Now the population is
nearly twice that. Living conditions have
changed too. For example, whereas 33 per
cent of the people lived on farms then, only
7 per cent do now—and the farm is a differ-
ent place. Horses and mules have largely
disappeared from the countryside as well as
from city streets. Autos and gasoline have
made a place for themselves and for un-
counted earthmoving machines and highway
engineers. On the railroads, steam locomo-
tives have been replaced by dicsels. We now
have a fine new assortment of chemicals and
chemists, computers and programmers, jet
planes and jet pilots, spaceships and space-
men. The iceman no longer tracks mud on
the kitchen floor; the TV man goes to the
family room. Disposal as well as creation of
income has been facilitated by development
of 36-month auto instalment paper and 30-
year home mortgages.
Enough. No one will deny dramatic
changes over this 50-year interval. But have
Chart 3
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Comparison of three indexes of manufactures to show elfects
f adjustments for number of working days and for seasonal
ariations. Curve 1 is eomputed from data measuring total
monthly output, curve 2 from data measuring daily average
.mtput. and curve 3 from data measuring daily average output
idjusted for seasonal variations. Curves are all drawn on the
;ame scale and are placed at different levels on chart in order
o show distinctly the month-to-month ikictuations of each one.
changes during the period been of a sort to
affect cyclical analysis? What do they sug-
gest about trend analysis? Seasonal adjust-
ment? Regression analysis? Model-building?
IMPACT OF WARS
The first observation must be, most tragi-
cally, that two world wars and numerous
lesser wars have been fought in these 50
years, with widespread repercussions on all
sorts of activities, private and public. Over
extended periods they have upset Mitchell's
rhythm of economic fluctuation and Kuz-
nets' growth patterns.
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Thus, in Western Europe, industrial pro-
duction was drastically curtailed during both
world wars; in the United States it was not
(Chart 4). Partly because of this and the
need for reconstruction in Western Europe,
output there after both wars expanded
much more rapidly than in the United States.
Although the world is now much more
closely integrated in many ways than it was
early in the century, cyclical fluctuations in
Europe for a decade and a half have been
observable only as minor hesitations in ex-
pansion, while in the United States output
has dipped cyclically four times. By the late
1950's, almost everyone had forgotten the
spritely generalization that "when the United
States catches cold, Europe gets pneumonia."
Domestically, military activities have al-
tered the underlying structure of peacetime
demand, with defense outlays now 10 per
cent of gross national product, whereas in
1913 the country had virtually no defense
outlays. Military activities have greatly al-
tered tax structures. They also have had a
major impact on technological change
throughout the economy. Military flight re-
quirements, for example, have greatly stimu-
lated the development of light-weight mate-
rials, heat-resistant materials, and many sorts
of space-saving devices.
Clearly, for extended periods wars and
their aftermath have dominated the course
of activity in many countries. And over the
longer term they have altered a good many
basic conditions affecting activity and prices
and flows of goods, services, and capital.
In some countries wars have even been a
major factor in altering the whole organiza-
tion of economic activity. The revolution in
Russia came in 1917. More recently, the
shift of many peoples from colonial status
to independence has been speeded by World
War II. Also, the less extensive institutional
changes in this country in the 1930's may
be attributed in part to the impact of World
War I in disrupting production patterns, dis-
torting value relationships, and encouraging
many financial commitments that later could
not be met.
IMPACT OF DEPRESSION OF 1930's
The depression of the 1 930"s, like the war
periods, had both short-term and longer-
lasting effects on economic behavior and on
economic analysis. Rising trends calculated
in the 1920's were written off almost imme-
diately, and debate raged over the nature
and sources of stagnation. With a fourth of
the labor force unemployed by 1932 and
all the banks closed in early 1933 there was
an almost total eclipse of trend analysis and
also of cyclical analysis. Even seasonal fac-
tors were suspect in industries such as those
producing cement, where output for the year
1932 was down 60 per cent from the late
1920's, and steel and autos, where output
was off 75 per cent. In fact, depressed con-
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ditions in the cement industry led to Federal
Reserve use for a time of seasonal allow-
ances of so many barrels rather than so many
per cent of current output.
Population did continue to increase, but
the rate of increase, which had begun to
slow down in the middle 1920's, when im-
migration was restricted, by the mid-1930's
was less than half the earlier rate (Chart 5).
The effects of the sharp reduction in births
in that period are still evident in current
statistics on the labor force and the mar-
riage rate.
High levels of unemployment, widespread
business failures, and collapse of many fi-
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nancial institutions created demands for re-
lief and for reorganization along many lines.
The social security system, new arrange-
ments for financing home buying, new labor
laws, and new farm measures adopted in that
period have proved in most instances to be
permanent features of our economic system.
So have new rules adopted for security mar-
kets, including requirements for registration
of new issues with a newly formed Securities
and Exchange Commission, standardized
reporting to the Commission by publicly
owned companies, and also credit margin
requirements administered by the Federal
Reserve. New theories concerning the pur-
poses and functions of Federal finance were
advanced by Keynes an<jl others, and many
of the built-in stabilizers had their origin in
that period.
Agricultural price-support policies, adopt-
ed at that time primarily to protect farmers
and their creditors, incidentally have greatly
modified speculation and price fluctuations
in markets for leading farm commodities.
The reduced fluctuations in cotton prices,
for example, are clearly evident in the record
of the past 8 years (Chart 6). Cotton prices
in this period have held within a range of
30 to 36 cents, with changes within par-
ticular years varying from 5 to 15 per cent;
the corresponding figures for the years from
1922 to 1929 were 11 to 35 cents, and 15
to 50 per cent. Wheat price fluctuations have
also been reduced, though not so much.
In contrast, fluctuations in steel scrap prices











1915 1915 193S 1945 1955 1965
Federal Reserve Bulletin: September 19631204 FEDERAL RESERVE BULLETIN • SEPTEMBER 1963
The more or less permanent effects of all
such policy developments on the operation
of the economy and the nature of economic
change cannot be summarized even roughly
by a single figure comparable to the 10 per
cent of GNP cited as now going to defense.
They may none the less be significant. Their
significance, moreover, need not depend
wholly on whether the country has been
made depression-proof by new attitudes re-
flected in the measures adopted during the
1930's, in later legislation such as the Em-
ployment Act of 1946, and in various ad-
ministrative policies.
If it should happen that we do not have
a depression or a major war over the next
half century, then the economic record of the
next 50 years will be very different from
that of the 50 years just past. And pre-
sumably it will be much more amenable to
economic analysis, particularly with refer-
ence to trends. Meanwhile, in seeking rela-
tionships from data for the past half century
to project into the future we need to take
due cognizance of the wars and depressions
of the past and their impact on the record.
We need to remember wars and depressions
when we draw or interpret trends, strike
averages for the length and depth of cycles,
calculate seasonals, run regressions, and
build models.
Of particular moment for much current
analysis, the economic consequences of
World War II merit attention when we think
about the significance of changes in postwar
years. For example, the list of postwar short-
ages of goods was too long to be treated
lightly. The aftermath of wartime finance
included a money supply so large that not
much further expansion was to be expected
or desired for some years. More generally,
in studying a wide range of economic devel-
opments, we need to remember that the af-
termath of war or depression may last 2
years for one series, 5 years for another, 10
or 15—or even more—for a third. And we
need to remember that for some series even
the little wars are pertinent; production rec-
ords for coal and oil were altered sharply by
the Suez incident.
IMPACT OF OTHER INFLUENCES
Influences other than wars and depressions
that have a bearing on changes in the econ-
omy and in economic analysis are many and
difficult to disentangle. Moreover, they go
back a long, long way. Looking a little be-
yond 1913, we note a comment of David A.
Wells in a vigorous preface to his Recent
Economic Changes, written in 1889 [6]:
"The economic changes that have occurred
during the last quarter of a century —or dur-
ing the present generation of living men—
have unquestionably been more important
and varied than during any former corre-
sponding period of the world's history." And
he had much to say about "inventing and
perfecting tools and machinery, building
workshops and factories, and devising in-
strumentalities for the easy intercommuni-
cation of persons and thoughts and the cheap
exchange of products and services." After
further comment on the marvels of progress,
he noted that "concurrently, or as the neces-
sary sequence of these changes, has come a
series of widespread disturbances"—disturb-
ances which "to many thoughtful and con-
servative minds" seemed to presage "an
attack on the present organization of society
and even the permanency of civilization
itself."
In 1913 reform was in the air, with pass-
age of the Clayton Antitrust Act less than a
year after the Federal Reserve Act and with
adoption of the 17th amendment providing
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for direct election of Senators soon after the
16th authorizing Federal income taxes.
Child labor was under attack. The number
of youths going to high school or even to
college was increasing rapidly. For those
employed, working hours were being sharply
reduced.
MANUFACTURING WORKWEEK
Average weekly hours of work at factories
had already declined from 53 in 1900 to 49
in 1913, although the workweek of 66 hours
at steel mills was not to be lowered until after
World War I (Chart 7). By 1929 the aver-
age factory workweek was down to 45 hours,
and further reductions were brought about
by the depression and the Fair Labor Stand-
ards Act providing overtime pay beyond 40
hours. In the postwar period, although paid
weekly hours, at around 40, have shown
little change, actual working time per year
has been reduced somewhat further by in-
creases in paid holidays and vacations. Out-
side manufacturing there have been further
reductions in the workweek during the post-
war period.
Continuing reductions in working hours
and substantial increases in production per
capita have ben made possible in part by
increased employment of women but to a
greater extent by persistent increases in out-
put per hour, commonly referred to as "out-
put per man-hour." These increases in out-
put per man-hour, in turn, have reflected a
complex of developments in education, tech-
nology, management, saving, investment,
and research—and also changes in attitudes
of people all the way from the workbench
to the Supreme Court.
Trends. For aggregate production, it
would almost seem as though the underlying
forces for growth had been so strong as to
lead to a trend for the first 60 years of this
century in this country which could be re-
garded as meaningful despite many changes
in the economy. A single 2.9 per cent straight
line keeps fairly close company with all the
data for real GNP, except for periods of de-
pression and war. The same is true of a 3.6
per cent straight line trend for industrial
production (Chart 8). Raised slightly, these
trend lines would represent the general drift
of nondepression peacetime years a little
more closely.
RYATGNP AND INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION
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One theory explaining persistence of a
given rate of growth might be that in the
long run developments that deflect activity
from its general course—such as wars and
depressions—tend to stimulate adjustments
of various sorts that bring activity back on
course. Perhaps we should assume here that
the whole has a life of its own, independent
of the parts, and that, as a matter of behav-
ior, the whole is an amount to which the
parts must add, even though, as a matter of
arithmetic, the whole is nothing more than
the sum of the parts. This idea I have found
difficult to grasp. But I seem to be reluctant
to discard it without comment.
Under conditions of not too rapid change
in basic economic organization or human
values, opposing pressures—on the one
hand, to find employment and to utilize
growing resources and, on the other, to
realize the gains in productivity in forms
other than additional goods and services—
might be offsetting for some time and might
lead to a fairly constant rate of growth in
real GNP. I am inclined, however, to re-
gard the re-emergence of the predepression
growth rate as reflecting to a considerable
degree an accidental offsetting of depression
influences by World War II influences. I
doubt if there is sufficient reason to suppose
that changes in the rates of change in popu-
lation, labor force participation, employ-
ment, hours of work, and productivity must
continue to balance out so that in the next
half century the growth rate in real GNP
will be very close to the 2.9 per cent rate pre-
vailing since the beginning of the century.
If the years from 1930 to 1945 are set aside,
the rate for the other three 15-year sub-
periods has been close to 3.5.
The rate of increase in output per man-
hour for private production, estimated at
around 1.4 per cent early in the century,
has accelerated. In the postwar period it
has been over 3 per cent (Chart 9). This
indicated doubling in the rate of increase hi
productivity has been offset by lower rates of
increase in some other elements. Population,
for example, has been growing somewhat less
rapidly since World War II than in the early





generally around 1.6 or 1.7 per cent rather
than 2 per cent (Chart 5). The rate in 1962
was down to 1.5 per cent.
As we consider possibilities for future
broad trends, we can be clear that typical
retardation of growth in production over the
life of particular industries is not of itself
evidence of any tendency toward retardation
in growth in output in the economy as a
whole. Growth in the economy depends
partly on how many industries are in a stage
of rapid growth, as Arthur M. Burns ob-
served in his Production Trends in the
United States Since 1870, published in 1934
[7], and as Walther G. Hoffman emphasized
in his British Industry, 1700-1950 [8].
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Nor can the retardation of growth in a
particular industry in one period be accepted
as a sure guide to the future of even that one
industry. New demands may appear as they
did for cement (Chart 2). On the supply
side, too, even old industries may be revo-
lutionized. Thus the output per acre of cot-
ton and three other major crops, which Kuz-
nets cited as showing little change in the last
three decades of the 19th century and the
first two of the 20th, has doubled in the last
four decades.
Also, I think the evidence does not point
to any decline in the importance of new dis-
coveries. Electricity has done many jobs the
steam engine was totally unfitted to do di-
rectly—in homes as well as in industry. Elec-
tronic computers seem to represent at least
as much of an advance over electro-mechan-
ical tabulating equipment as that equipment
represented over hand-cranked desk calcu-
lators. Computers seem destined to alter
basically the nature of a wide range of in-
dustrial activities as well as many types of
office work. As aids to research of all sorts
they may well have a significant impact also
on almost every other type of activity, not
excluding agricultural production, construc-
tion, and the practice of medicine and law.
More broadly—with all due respect to the
facts to be found in volumes on Recent Eco-
nomic Changes published in 1889 [6] and
in 1929 [9]—perhaps one of the most signifi-
cant observations to be made about the eco-
nomic scene in the United States now in
contrast with that half or three-quarters of
a century ago is that change seems to be
more readily accepted as a feature of almost
every phase of life. This is one of the chief
reasons why so many people are willing to
entrust their family heirlooms, if any, to
moving vans.
Reference to the increased tempo of
change seems to call insistently for discus-
sion of developments abroad where the shift
in tempo—from a less rapid pace in the
earlier period—may well be greater than in
this country. But domestic developments
alone, it seems to me, are quite sufficient to
warrant the emphasis here on the impor-
tance of change as an element to be consid-
ered at every point in analyzing economic
conditions.
Cycles. For further study of changes in
the economy and their impact on cycles,
seasonals, and other relatively short-time
fluctuations, it would be convenient if we
could regard some recent period, even a
few years, as free from war and depression
influences. The 10-year period since 1953
would be one possibility. It was only in mid-
1953, however, that the Korean truce was
arranged. Also, at that time Western Europe
was still years away from Article VIII cur-
rency convertibility, and the Treasury-
Federal Reserve accord had been reached
only 2 years earlier. Production was quite
high in relation to capacity, and postwar
inflationary forces were still so strong that
prices were to rise sharply when boom con-
ditions developed after recovery from the
1954 recession.
Another possibility is the period since
1957. Altogether, for present purposes this
short period is perhaps as good as any
other. We do well to remember, however,
that even in 1957 it was not clear that post-
war inflationary tendencies were being—or
could be—modified as much as now seems,
in retrospect, to have been the case (Chart
10). Also, it may be argued with some force
that at least the fairly sharp recession of
1958 belonged to and for many purposes
should be grouped with the years preceding
1958.







NOTE.—Figures for production are adjusted for seasonal varia-
tion.
While industrial production as a whole
showed a rise of 17 per cent over the 5-year
period from 1957 to 1962, industrial chemi-
cals, including synthetic materials, were
up 55 per cent, electric and gas utilities
41 per cent, and rubber and plastics products
33 per cent. On the other hand, transpor-
tation equipment other than autos showed
little change, oil drilling was off 11 per cent,
iron and steel 12, and coal 17.
In these 5 years industrial chemicals
rose from 3.6 per cent of total industrial
output to 4.8, passing iron and steel, which
declined from 6.2 to 4.6 per cent. For strict
accuracy, note should be made that these
shares are calculated without allowance for
the effect of relative price changes on value-
added relationships.
Such shifts in composition of industrial
and other output naturally affect the cycli-
cal behavior of the total. So also do basic
changes in the utilization of resources and
the outlook for price changes, such as oc-
curred in the same short period. And in the
background are many longer-term trends,
in both domestic and international affairs.
At the low in April 1958 industrial pro-
duction was off 14 per cent from the August
1957 level. This decline was substantially
more than the 10 per cent in 1954 or the
8 per cent in 1949. The most recent decline,
in 1960-61, was only 6 per cent (Chart 10).
Meanwhile, industrial prices as a whole
stabilized in mid-1959, after only moderate
advances during a single year of expanding
activity. The preceding advance in industrial
prices, after the 1954 recession, had been
much more rapid and had continued more
than 2 years. In the recovery after the 1960-
61 recession, industrial prices as a whole
showed no advance, and the rise even for
commodities whose prices are particularly
sensitive to changes in demand was small
and short-lived. Such variety of experience
in production, price, and other changes is
not new in the annals of cycles—many of
Mitchell's original data related to years of
depression in the 1890's, others to periods of
more moderate fluctuation. But the recent
historical record does remind us of the con-
tinuing need for a sharp look at averages of
cyclical experience and for selective analysis
of each cycle.
From the low in early 1961 to mid-1962
industrial production and real GNP rose
considerably, but after that industrial pro-
duction held within a range of less than a
point for 7 months and GNP rose only mod-
erately. As late as last March the question
was being asked whether this extended pe-
riod of near stability in activity was a
forerunner of recession, a mere hesitation
in a general advance, or the beginning of
a long period in which neither the expan-
sive forces nor the contractive forces would
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prove to be cumulative in their effects.
When the economy emerged on the up-
side, other questions arose. Was February
the twenty-fourth month of recovery and
expansion or the first? Had we had a Euro-
pean-type recession, with less than a 1 per
cent decline in industrial production after
mid-1962 but with noticeable declines in the
rate of inventory accumulation and in plant
and equipment expenditures? Such questions
suggest that complexity and uncertainty in
cyclical behavior and cyclical analysis are
not to be denied, inconvenient as they may
be for those who seek simple answers.
Taking a look at cyclical experience over
all 18 years of the postwar period, we see
first that there has been no postwar depres-
sion to parallel the one beginning 11 years
after World War I. In Western Europe,
meanwhile, even the shorter cycles have
been so minor that recessions have been
mainly periods of pause in rapid growth.
How far the improved cyclical record of this
postwar period may be attributed to greater
wisdom and how far to other factors is hard
to tell.
In this country shorter cycles of signifi-
cant amplitude have persisted, bearing some
resemblance to interwar cycles and perhaps
more to each other. All four postwar periods
of appreciable decline in industrial produc-
tion have continued 7 or 8 months, although
the amount of decline has varied widely
(Chart 10). Also, recovery in each instance
has been rapid for a while even though the
time elapsed before the start of rapid recov-
ery has ranged from no time at all in the
spring of 1958 to several months in 1954.
The length of complete cycles has varied
from 3 to 5 years. But all such counting be-
comes truly meaningful for analysis of the
future only as the circumstances of each sit-
uation are reviewed. And a word must be
added concerning the changing meaning of
"cyclical high" from one period to another.
A cyclical high may involve, as in the
mid-1950's, generally active use of re-
sources, shortages in some lines, efforts to
accumulate inventories, rapid capital ex-
pansion, widespread increases in prices—
of commodities and services, and of real
estate and other capital items—and various
other elements that together make the situa-
tion unsustainable and likely to be followed
by sharp reaction. Or the cyclical high may
not be very high; in 1959-60 the low in un-
employment was about 5 per cent, whereas
in the mid-1950's it was around 4 per cent.
The 1960-61 recession that followed was
mild, and recovery and expansion since early
1961 have been substantial. The labor force
has been expanding, however, and with out-
put per manhour up sharply, unemployment
this summer was still 5.5 per cent or more.
Rates were lower than this for certain
groups—a little over 3 per cent for married
adult males with wife present—but much
higher for some groups not adequately
trained to meet modern job requirements
or for other reasons at a disadvantage in
labor markets.
Unemployment rates for labor and ca-
pacity use rates for equipment, incidentally,
throw a special light on the nature of cyclical
highs and cyclical changes generally. They
are by definition "adjusted for trend," after
a fashion, whereas production and employ-
ment figures typically are not. Neither type
of series by itself tells the whole story of
current developments.
SEASONALS
Seasonal movements, being in considerable
measure determined by weather, might ap-
pear to be less affected than cycles or trends
by various changes in the economy. Can we
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perhaps use "constant seasonals" and avoid
the paradox implied in "changing season-
als"? Under some circumstances, yes. But
sooner or later in a changing economy every
seasonal pattern turns out to be changing.
One way out is to use more than one set of
constant factors with breaks in between, but
this approach often creates greater problems
than it solves.
Why do seasonals change? Perhaps the
question should be put the other way; why
should seasonals stay the same? An industry
such as industrial chemicals, in which out-
put rose 55 per cent in the 5 years from 1957
to 1962, may be expected to have constant
seasonals only if the increased output con-
sists of similar products sold to customers
in similar areas, and then only if these prod-
ucts are turned out in similar plants and are
otherwise subject to similar seasonal influ-
ences on the supply side—or if various
changes offset each other. For industrial
chemicals seasonals did change in this period
—but only moderately.
For a quite different set of reasons there
has been a marked change since 1960 in the
seasonal behavior of rates on 3-month
Treasury bills. Those reasons relate to
changes in the nature of Treasury and Fed-
eral Reserve participation in this market and
to the responses made to these changes by
other market participants.
Changes in the composition of produc-
tion or other series, from year to year as well
as over longer periods, make difficult any
satisfactory direct adjustment of totals
whose parts have different seasonals. Thus
they argue for adjusting totals by adjusting
parts and adding the results, except where
the parts behave too erratically to permit
separate adjustment. The two approaches
sometimes lead to quite different results, as
they did for industrial production in mid-
1962. The direct adjustment of the total
suggested that this "coincident indicator"
was declining from March to June, perhaps
taking its cue from the "leading indicators."
The regularly published series derived from
the seasonally adjusted parts meanwhile rose
further.
The issue of adjusting totals directly or
via the parts is only one of several affected
by rapid changes; for example, such changes
greatly complicate the estimating of termi-
nal year seasonals. The year 1958, with
sharp turnaround in activity after April,
was by no means a vintage year for produc-
tion seasonals. For quite a few series, sea-
sonals calculated with 1958 data as the last
in the series were distorted not only in 1958
but all the way back to 1955. Dropping
1958 data out of the calculations improved
the results substantially.
Adjust series seasonally as you will to
take out variations recurring every twelfth
month or fourth quarter—in order better
to reveal the general drift—and there will
still remain confusing changes of other
sorts. These changes are ordinarily called
"irregular," or even "random," although
actually they may contain elements of reg-
ularity. "Irregular" fluctuations—due to one
more snowstorm than usual this particular
January, a strike, a revision in Regulation
Q, a quirk of reporting, or any of a hundred
and one other special circumstances—are
reflected, along with other nonseasonal in-
fluences, in the final "adjusted" series. All
too often this is forgotten. For series as
erratic as monthly business failures, new
capital issues, or housing starts it hardly
could be.
FACTS AND DATA AND ANALYSIS
So far changes in the economy have been
treated largely as though they affected anal-
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ysis directly, without reference to data prob-
lems. Actually, over the years the quantity
and quality of data available have improved
considerably. Our data now tell us some-
thing about more subjects, are shown in
more detail, and are classified in more mean-
ingful ways. They are available for shorter
time periods, and they are available more
promptly. Quite a few of our figures are
collected under the guidance of sampling
experts and processed into refined numbers
by electronic computers under the direction
of scholars versed in the dark arts of editing
and adjustment—adjustment for nonre-
sponse, adjustment for nonworking days,
adjustment for seasonal variation, adjust-
ment to benchmark. We make more serv-
iceable estimates of crucial current figures,
and we make them less reluctantly. We also
make more revisions than ever before to set
the record straight. A modern Shakespeare
could have fun with the ages in the life of
a mid-century statistic.
The evolution of data preparation has
blurred the distinction between data prepa-
ration and analysis. More data collectors try
to find out what information is needed, and
more committees argue over treatises on the
meaning of concepts such as unemployment
and productivity. A man who has really
learned what GNP is—or industrial pro-
duction—has dealt with quite a few eco-
nomic realities. He knows something about
prices as well as "quantities." He is versed
in the subtleties of weighting and is aware
of the distinction between an establishment
and an enterprise. He is alert to the dangers
in ignoring gaps and the dangers in filling
them on the basis of unwarranted assump-
tions. He understands, hopefully, how the
circumstances of the time affect the signifi-
cance of the numbers under review.
The improved data now at hand offer
new opportunities to analysts of every per-
suasion. Almost every question may stimu-
late the making of one or more regressions,
and elaborate models may be built with the
hope of finding numbers more or less ap-
propriate for the purpose in hand. But in
such operations—as in mathematically less
complicated approaches—it is easy to lose
one's way, unless one is familiar with the
limitations that still characterize available
data.
Looking back to the Census of Population
for 1910 we can readily see internal evidence
of statistical trouble in that modern time.
The number of people reported as 40 years
old was 1.5 million, which was 700,000
more than the number 41 years old and,
even more startling, 400,000 more than the
number 39 years old. Obviously, a certain
carelessness had crept in somewhere along
the way, presumably in the answering of a
simple question by the original respondent.
The population figures for 1910 showed
considerably less "heaping" at the adult "0"
years than in 1880, but they still were not
good enough. Gradually over the decades
this particular problem has been cut down
to size. Have we similarly mastered the
problem of finding out what consumers plan
to buy and what the plans they report at a
particular time may mean in terms of the
purchases they—or somebody else—will ac-
tually make?
In the 1960 Census of Population, one of
the many sources of error on the long route
from the respondent's answer to the finished
statistic has been eliminated. Information on
the original schedule is transmitted direct to
the computer without any card punching. In
this operation quality control standards for
the permissible number of punching errors
are no longer needed. True, in this particular
Census, occasional failures in the microfilm-
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ing process caused some entire pages of
schedules to be unreadable by FOSDIC
(Film Optical Sensing Device for Input to
Computers), but the damage was minor.
For most economic statistics the struggle to
minimize card punching errors—as well as
all the other potential mishaps along the way
—must go on.
Considering conceptual problems, report-
ing problems, processing problems, and ad-
justment problems, those who ask the data
producer to state just what probability there
is that the particular figures being issued are
accurate within certain ranges are asking
quite a little. The sampling error that is sub-
ject to quantification is only one of several
problems. Fortunately it is possible, by
charting and studying series, by keeping
in mind the degree of irregularity typical
of particular series, by noting the position
last month, and by being informed as to the
surrounding circumstances, to make use of
series which are not known to be accurate
within a narrow range.
People acquainted with the uncertainties
of various statistics relating to production,
employment, prices, and the like sometimes
long for the certainties they associate with
banking—accounts always balance. It is evi-
dent, however, that no matter how carefully
banks keep their books and how specific the
rules may be for valuing assets, various cur-
rent banking statistics are subject to prob-
lems such as those relating to the represent-
ativeness of respondent banks and the com-
parability of reporting dates. Months may
end on one day of the week or another, and
it may make a difference. The week ending
in the middle of March may be closer this
year to the corporate income tax payment
date than it was last year. Year to year
changes in the timing of Treasury financing
operations also often complicate the inter-
pretation of reported changes in bank credit
and bank deposits.
In construction and real estate many data
problems remain unsolved. For example, in-
formation on the amount of office space, oc-
cupied and unoccupied, is still inadequate.
Again, Census takers have found so many
more houses standing than had been expected
that a substantial revision in housing starts
data before 1959 is being considered. Such
a revision, if made, would raise the level of
starts in the early postwar years sharply in
relation to more recent years. It would also
raise the level in relation to existing prewar
figures—but those figures are also in process
of revision, from 1840 to 1939.
The repercussions of a revision in post-
war housing starts would extend to the series
on residential construction activity and total
construction activity, to all the series of
which they are parts, including GNP, and
to all the series derived by comparing these
series with other series. All this is recited
not to decry revisions—which scientific can-
dor demands be made—but rather to em-
phasize the intricacy of the whole structure
of data and analysis. One way to improve
analysis is to improve data.
In another area, also long recognized as
particularly difficult to handle, series show-
ing changes in the seasonally adjusted book
values of inventories in some periods, as in
the summer and autumn of 1962, fluctuate
so irregularly and over so wide a range
from month to month as to disturb some
analysts. Those encountering problems here
should recognize that practically all series
have an irregular component which cannot
be expected to yield to adjustment of any
sort, save the last resort smoothing of ad-
justed series. But they may also be pleased
that efforts to improve the basic series are
continuing and that many respondents,
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newly equipped with electronic computers,
are coming to be in a better position to
answer inventory questions.
Basic to every economic statistic is the
unit of measurement—and the economic sig-
nificance of almost every unit is subject to
change. While the number of pounds in a
short ton does not change even over long
periods, the quality of the steel being
weighed may improve appreciably. Speci-
fying a size range for electric generators
may not yield strict comparability—the pro-
portion of generators toward the top of the
range may be higher at one time than at
another. The design of products and the
materials of which they are made are con-
tinually changing, confusing the meaning of
any simple count. The list of problems re-
lating to "physical volume" measures is by
no means short.
Many of the data available for analysis
are expressed in dollar terms. In one sense
a dollar is always a dollar, but what it will
buy is another question. A rise of $1 billion
in inventory holdings in a period of price
stability represents much more accumula-
tion than a rise of the same amount in a
period of advancing prices. Interpretation
of current changes in the whole wide range
of dollar series—for shipments as well as
inventories, loans extended as well as loans
outstanding, payments for currently pro-
duced goods and for existing assets—clearly
needs to take account of price behavior.
Even when the "general level" of prices is
stable, particular prices may be changing
considerably. So, for many purposes it is
uesful to "deflate" current dollar figures to
obtain "constant dollar" figures.
But problems in deflating value figures
are many. Matching prices imbedded in
value figures with price indexes that really
correspond would often require more de-
tailed information about prices and quanti-
ties than that now available, and informa-
tion of different types. For example, do we
know whether the prices in this month's
shipments are prices quoted this month or
some months ago? Whether for any par-
ticular group in any particular period de-
flated value figures do now provide a better
"constant dollar" measure than can be ob-
tained from other data depends on all the
virtues and all the limitations of the data
being considered.
One way to improve actual deflation of
value figures will be to collect price data
with this objective more in mind. But it will
be well to remember that price data are
useful for many other purposes.
Modern statistical techniques and com-
puting devices are helping to broaden under-
standing of the nature of data problems and
to meet a wide variety of such problems.
Basic to further improvement in data are
increased data requirements for private and
public administrative purposes and deeper
understanding of the significance of good
data for good analysis.
Data by themselves will not provide solu-
tions to economic problems, no matter how
plentiful and accurate the data may be.
Hypotheses as to which phenomena are rele-
vant and how they are related are essential
at every stage of analysis. But it is important
to have information as reliable and perti-
nent as possible as a basis for proceeding
to each next step in an inquiry or a demon-
stration. On occasion, data problems in im-
plementing certain preferred concepts may
even be so great that the better part of valor
is to use serviceable concepts that can be
well implemented rather than preferred con-
cepts that cannot.
If we can assume that the data are be-
coming more descriptive of the facts and that
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the facts are becoming more amenable to
analysis as we get farther away from the last
war and the last depression, how is economic
analysis developing? Certainly actual events
in recent years have differed enough from
those predicted to call for many second
thoughts. For example, must all analysis
assume creeping inflation, as a consequence
of the modern distribution of economic
power? Five years of little change in the
wholesale price level would suggest that
this position, once so widely accepted, in
this form or with a proviso about resource
utilization, is one of those that need to be
reviewed. In another area, events of recent
years relating to the international flows of
goods and services and funds have been
hard on many earlier suppositions. The rec-
ord of shorter-term forecasts for 1962 and
1963 suggests that if we are to be successful
in forecasting results we shall need to know
more about causes.
Certainly the new equipment developed
in recent decades—a fascinating succession
of new computing, charting, printing, and
display devices—has been an extraordi-
narily powerful force for change. This new
equipment and the new statistical techniques
developed in recent decades together make
feasible inquiries and demonstrations be-
yond possible consideration before.
That thinking about time series analysis
is being pushed in various new directions is
clearly evident. Witness the development of
flow of funds accounts and continuing pres-
sures to build an integrated system of time
series tied to the national accounts as one
mold, perhaps the mold, into which the eco-
nomic world should be cast. Witness the
spread of seasonal adjustment and the cur-
rent reconsideration of methods of seasonal
adjustment. Witness the expanding efforts
to capture the essentials of many economic
relationships in regressions and in large-scale
models.
This is not the place to appraise such ef-
forts; it is appropriate to note, however, that
economic change is a central fact to be dealt
with, and that formal tidiness in formula-
tion of a problem is only one of many virtues.
Experimentation along such lines need not
preclude experimentation along other lines.
The Harvard ABC curves of the 1920's were
neat, in their own way, and perished. More
broadly, the experience of the past half cen-
tury suggests that history is full of surprises,
especially for those who are sure, and that a
good analyst needs to be a good historian as
well as a good mathematician.
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